Valerie E. Stone

Selective impairment of reasoning about social exchange in a patient with bilateral limbic system damage

Authors:

  • Valerie E. Stone

  • Leda Cosmides

  • John Tooby

  • Neal E. A. Kroll

  • Robert T. Knight

Date: 2002

PubMed: 12177408

View PDF

Abstract:

Social exchange is a pervasive feature of human social life. Models in evolutionary biology predict that for social exchange to evolve in a species, individuals must be able to detect cheaters (nonreciprocators). Previous research suggests that humans have a cognitive mechanism specialized for detecting cheaters. Here we provide neurological evidence indicating that social exchange reasoning can be selectively impaired while reasoning about other domains is left intact. The patient, R.M., had extensive bilateral limbic system damage, affecting orbitofrontal cortex, temporal pole, and amygdala. We compared his performance on two types of reasoning problem that were closely matched in form and equally difficult for control subjects: social contract rules (of the form, "If you take the benefit, then you must satisfy the requirement") and precaution rules (of the form, "If you engage in hazardous activity X, then you must take precaution Y"). R.M. performed significantly worse in social contract reasoning than in precaution reasoning, when compared both with normal controls and with other brain-damaged subjects. This dissociation in reasoning performance provides evidence that reasoning about social exchange is a specialized and separable component of human social intelligence, and is consistent with other research indicating that the brain processes information about the social world differently from other types of information.

Frontal lobe contributions to theory of mind

Authors:

  • Valerie E. Stone

  • Simon Baron-Cohen

  • Robert T. Knight

Date: 1998

PubMed: 9802997

View PDF

Abstract:

"Theory of mind," the ability to make inferences about others" mental states, seems to be a modular cognitive capacity that underlies humans" ability to engage in complex social interaction. It develops in several distinct stages, which can be measured with social reasoning tests of increasing difficulty. Individuals with Asperger"s syndrome, a mild form of autism, perform well on simpler theory of mind tests but show deficits on more developmentally advanced theory of mind tests. We tested patients with bilateral damage to orbito-frontal cortex (n = 5) and unilateral damage in left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (n = 5) on a series of theory of mind tasks varying in difficulty. Bilateral orbito-frontal lesion patients performed similarly to individuals with Asperger"s syndrome, performing well on simpler tests and showing deficits on tasks requiring more subtle social reasoning, such as the ability to recognize a faux pas. In contrast, no specific theory of mind deficits were evident in the unilateral dorsolateral frontal lesion patients. The dorsolateral lesion patients had difficulty only on versions of the tasks that placed demands on working memory.